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Abstract. In this work we study a weak Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which both
strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among
agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and
heterogeneous situations. We consider deterministic and stochastic update rules for
the strategies, which in turn may consider single links or full context when selecting
agents to copy from. Our results indicate that the co-evolutionary process preserves
heterogeneous networks as a suitable framework for the emergence of cooperation.
Furthermore, on those networks, the update rule leading to a larger fraction, which we
call replicator dynamics, is selected during co-evolution. On homogeneous networks we
observe that even if replicator dynamics turns out again to be the selected update rule,
the cooperation level is larger than on a fixed update rule framework. We conclude
that for a variety of topologies, the fact that the dynamics coevolves with the strategies
leads in general to more cooperation in the weak Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
PACS numbers: 05.45.Xt, 89.75.Fb
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1. Introduction
Evolutionary game theory on graphs or networks has attracted a lot of interest among
physicists in the last decade [1, 2], both because of the new phenomena that such a
non-hamiltonian dynamics [3] gives rise to and because of its very many important
applications [4, 5]. Prominent among these applications is the understanding of the
emergence of cooperation among bacteria, animals and humans [6]. In this context,
evolutionary game theory on graphs is relevant due to the fact that populations
interact with a reduced, fixed subset of the population has been proposed as one
of the mechanisms leading to cooperation among unrelated individuals [7]. Indeed,
the existence of a network of interactions may allow the assortment of cooperators in
clusters [8,9], that can outperform the defectors left on their boundaries. Unfortunately,
extensive research has shown that this proposal is not free from difficulties, in particular
due to the lack of universality of the evolutionary outcomes when changing the network
or the dynamics [2, 10]. In addition, recent experimental tests of the effect of networks
on the evolution of cooperation [11, 12] have led to new questions in so far as the
experimental results do not match any of the models available in the literature.
In this work, we address the issue of the lack of universality and the problems it
poses for applications to real world problems through the idea of co-evolution. The
rationale behind this approach is simple: if there are many possibilities regarding
networks or dynamics and no a priori reasons to favor one over another, one can take a
step beyond in evolutionary thought by letting a selection process act on those features:
The types of networks or dynamics that are not selected along the process should not be
considered then as ingredients of applicable models. This co-evolutionary perspective
has led to a number of interesting results in the last few years (see, e.g., [13, 14]
for reviews), starting from the pioneering work by Ebel and Bornholdt [15] on co-
evolutionary games on networks. Subsequently, a fruitful line of work has developed
by allowing players to rewire their links (e.g., [16–22]) or even forming the network
by adding new players with attachment criteria depending on the payoffs [23–25].
We here take a much less explored avenue, namely the simultaneous evolution of the
players’ strategies and the way they update them. This idea, first introduced in an
economic context by Kirchkamp [26] has been recently considered in biological and
physical contexts [27–29], proving itself promising as an alternative way to understand
the phenomenon of the emergence of cooperation.
Here we largely expand on the work by Moyano and Sa´nchez [27], where only
the case of a square lattice was considered. For that specific example, it was shown
that evolutionary competition between update rules gives rise to higher cooperation
levels than in a well-mixed context (complete graph) or when the update rules are fixed
and cannot evolve. We now aim to address this issue in a much more general setup
as regards the network of interactions, by considering a family of complex networks
proposed in [30] as the structure of the population. This will allow us to go from
complex but homogeneous networks to scale free ones, thus providing insight into what
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effects arise because of the specific degree distribution or because of the complexity of
the network. As we will see below, a wide variety of effects and results will emerge as a
product of this co-evolutionary process in this class of networks. In order to present our
findings, Section 2 introduces our model of the co-evolutionary process and recalls the
main features of the one-parameter family of networks we will use as substrate. Section
3 collects our results, organized in terms of the competition between pairs of update
rules. Finally, Sec. 4 summarizes our conclusions and discusses their implications.
2. The model
Following the scheme introduced for the first time in [27], our model is formulated
as follows: We consider a set of agents with two associated features: a strategy and
an update rule. The strategy can take two possible values, namely cooperation (C)
and defection (D), whereas for the update rule agents can take one of the following
three options: Replicator (REP), Moran-like (MOR) and Unconditional Imitation (UI)
rules, which we will define precisely below. These two features of individuals coevolve
simultaneously according to the evolutionary dynamics specified below thus yielding
an interesting feedback-loop between the game strategies and learning rules of the
population. The co-evolution process is specified by stipulating that when an individual,
applying her update rule, decides to copy the strategy of a neighboring agent, she copies
this agent’s update rule as well, i.e., the update process involves simultaneously the two
features of the agent. While this is clearly a more biologically inspired approach, it is
also possible to think of economic contexts in which not only decisions are imitated but
also the way to arrive to those decisions can be copied as well.
As usual in the studies on evolutionary dynamics on complex networks, every player
is represented by a node of the network. Agents thus arranged interact through a game
only with those players that are directly connected to them as dictated by the underlying
network. Mathematically, the network is encoded by its adjacency matrix A, whose
elements are Aij = Aji = 1 if nodes i and j are connected and Aij = Aji = 0 otherwise.
Therefore, given a network substrate the dynamics of each individual is driven by the
local constrains imposed by the topology. In order to study the effects of topology on
the evolution of the population we will study a family of different network topologies
generated by the model introduced by Go´mez-Garden˜es and Moreno in [30]. This family
of networks depends on one parameter of the model, α ∈ [0, 1], that measures the degree
of heterogeneity of the degree distribution, P (k), i.e. the probability of finding nodes
with degree k. Without going into full details of the model, that can be found in the
original reference [30], we find it convenient for the reader to briefly summarize its
definition. Networks are generated starting from a fully connected graph with m0 nodes
and a set U of N −m0 unconnected nodes. At each iteration of the growing process a
new node in the set U is chosen to create m new links. Each of these m links are formed
as follows: With probability α the link connects to any of the other N − 1 nodes in the
network with uniform probability; with probability (1− α) it links to a node following
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a preferential attachment strategy a´ la Baraba´si and Albert (BA) [31]. This procedure
is repeated until all the N −m0 nodes in U have been chosen. Obviously, when α = 0
the model generates BA scale-free networks with P (k) ∼ k−3. On the other hand, when
α = 1 the networks generated have a Poisson degree distribution as in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi
(ER) graphs [32]. For intermediate values of α one goes from the large heterogeneity
of scale-free networks for α = 0 to the homogeneous distributions found for α = 1. It
is worth stressing that the model preserves the total number of links, L, and nodes, N ,
for a proper comparison between different values of α. In the following we will focus on
the cases α = 0 (BA), 0.5 (intermediate) and 1.0 (ER).
Having defined the network that specifies the agents a given one will interact with,
we now need to define how that interaction takes place. Connected pair of nodes play
the so-called weak Prisoner’s Dilemma, introduced in the pioneering paper on games on
graphs by Nowak and May [33]:
C D
C
D
(
1
b
0
0
)
.
(1)
With this choice for the payoff matrix, when two agents cooperate with each other
they both receive a payoff 1. On the contrary, if one is a defector and the other plays
as cooperator the former receives b > 1 and the latter receives nothing. Finally, if
both nodes are defectors they do not earn anything. This setting is referred to as
a weak Prisoner’s Dilemma game because there is no risk in cooperating as in the
standard Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which a cooperator obtains a negative payoff (i.e., she
is punished) when facing a defector. Therefore, in the standard Prisoner’s Dilemma
cooperating involves the risk of losing payoff, whereas in its weak version that is not the
case, being the temptation to defect, b, the only obstacle to cooperation.
The last ingredient needed to specify our model, and the main focus of this study,
is the evolutionary dynamics. At a given time step, every player plays the game with
all her neighbors using the same strategy in all pairings, as usual in evolutionary game
theory on graphs. Once all the games are played, each agent collects the total payoff
obtained from playing with her neighbors, fi. Subsequently, agents have to decide what
strategy they will use in the next round, which they do by means of some update
rule. For the purposes of the present paper, we will consider only update rules based
on the payoff, those being more relevant to biological applications (where “payoff” is
interpreted as “fitness” or reproductive capacity). Among those, we will consider three
of the most often used rules [1, 2] (see Fig. 1 for a sketch of the different rules to help
grasp the differences between them):
• Replicator Dynamics (REP) [34,35]: Agent i chooses one neighbor at random, say
agent j, and compare their respective payoffs. If fj > fi, agent i will adopt the
state (i.e., the strategy and the update rule) of agent j with probability:
Π =
fj − fi
bmax (ki, kj)
, (2)
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where the denominator is chosen to ensure proper normalization of the probability.
In case fi > fj , agent i will keep the same dynamical state in the following
generation. A remark is in order there to indicate that REP is one of an infinite
number of rules that, when the number of agents is taken to infinity on a complete
graph, converges to the famous replicator equation [3], hence the name we have
used. Other authors prefer to call it “proportional imitation” to emphasize the fact
that other rules have the same limit, but we have kept the name REP because as
it is found in most textbooks (e.g., [5]).
• Unconditional Imitation (UI) [33]: Agent i compares its payoff with her neighbor
with the largest payoff, say agent j. If fj > fi agent i will copy the two features of
agent j for the next round of the game. Otherwise, agent i will remain unchanged.
• Moran rule (MOR) [10, 36]: Agent i chooses one of its neighbors proportionally to
its payoff, being the probability of choosing agent j given by:
Pj =
Aijfj∑
l Ailfl
. (3)
Subsequently, agent i changes its state to the one of the chosen neighbor.
We stress that, as stated above, and at variance with traditional evolutionary
dynamics, the above three update mechanisms refer to the dynamical state of the nodes,
here defined by both the strategy and the update rule. The three rules we have chosen
allow us to consider different aspects of the dynamics. Indeed, REP is stochastic and
link-focused (by this we mean that the update is carried out after just looking at one
of links of the agent); UI is deterministic and context-focused (the update depends
simultaneously on all the neighbors of the considered agent), and MOR is stochastic
and context-focused. A deterministic, link-focused rule would proceed to choose a link
at random and copy the agent in case that her payoff is larger. However, one can see
that this is basically the same as REP with a different probability normalization, and
that would simply amount to changing the time scale of the simulation. On the other
hand, only the first two rules are monotonous, in the sense that evolution proceeds
always in the direction of increasing fitness, and players do not make mistakes. This is
not the case of MOR, whereas the strategy for updating is chosen among all neighbors
with positive probability, irrespective of whether they do better or not. This is not the
only non-monotonous rule, and in fact one can introduce the possibility of such errors
in several manners, the most popular of them being the so-called Fermi rule [37] (see
also [38] for a generalization that interpolates between the standard Fermi rule and UI).
We have not included this rule here to avoid a proliferation of parameters (Fermi rule
depends on a temperature-like parameter that controls the number of mistakes) and of
possible pairs of strategies to compete, but it is clear that this is another interesting
example of non-monotonous, payoff-dependent update rule, and we will comment on it
in the conclusions.
In all cases, simulations proceed as follows: We begin with an initial configuration
composed equally of cooperators and defectors, randomly assigning the strategy of
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Figure 1. Example of update dynamics according to the three rules we use in this
work. On the top we represent a small portion of the network consisting of a central
agent with five neighbours. The numbers inside the circles are the hypothetical payoffs
of each player. The three pictures in the bottom represent the different possibilities for
the central player to update her strategy. The probability to copy a given neighbour is
indicated by its side. First, case (a) illustrates a central player with REP update. She
will imitate only neighbours doing better than herself (those with nonzero probability)
with probability proportional to the corresponding payoff difference with her own (that
with the largest probability is the most likely to be imitated); in the second picture (b),
explaining the UI dynamics, the central agent will imitate definitely her best neighbour,
i.e., the one with the largest payoff (provided it is larger than her own); finally, in the
MOR update rule (c), all the neighbours can be in principle imitated (provided they
do not receive the absolute minimum payoff), with a probability proportional to their
respective payoffs.
each of the N individuals with equal probability for both. For the update rule, the
second dynamical feature, it is also randomly distributed. In order to understand the
mechanisms at work in the competition of rules, we consider only the coexistence of two
update rules in the population, distributed uniformly among cooperators and defectors.
Thus, if A and B are the two updates rules chosen for the simulation, and x is the
initial fraction of individuals having A rule then the initial setting is composed of xN/2
individuals with initial state (C,A), (1 − x)N/2 with (C,B), xN/2 with (D,A) and
(1− x)N/2 with (D,B). From this initial configuration, the simulation proceeds round
by round, with the payoffs being reset to zero after every round in agreement with the
general procedure (i.e., we do not accumulate payoffs). Simulations are run until a
stationary state is reached, which we verified it is achieved after 4000 rounds. We then
measured the magnitudes of interest averaging over another 100 rounds, and the whole
process was repeated for 100 realizations for every set of parameters. We varied the
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value of b from 1 to 2 in steps of 0.025, and the frequency of one of the rules in the
initial condition from 0 to 1, also in steps of 0.025. We used networks with 5000 nodes
and mean degree 〈k〉 = 6 for α = 0, 0.5 and 1. Finally, it is worth mentioning that
individuals update their dynamical states in parallel. This is the commonly adopted
choice in simulations of evolutionary game theory and, although some differences have
been reported in specific cases with sequential dynamics [39], changes are in general
limited to a narrow range of parameters [2, 10, 40], at least for homogeneous networks
(but see Fig. 4b in [41] for a specific example of large differences in scale-free networks
under UI dynamics).
3. Results
In this section, we present the results obtained when pairs of different update rules
are subject to the selection pressure arising from the co-evolutionary process. We
have chosen to focus on two main quantities: The average level of cooperation in the
asymptotic regime, 〈c〉, and the final composition of the population in terms of the
update rule. As we will see, these two magnitudes are already enough to understand all
the mechanisms at work during the co-evolution. We have also looked at the dynamics
of individual realizations to ensure that our interpretation of the results is correct. In
what follows, we discuss our findings for the three possible competitions between pairs of
update rules: Moran versus Replicators, Moran versus Imitators and Replicators versus
Imitators.
3.1. Moran versus Replicators
To begin with, we deal with the two stochastic update rules, MOR and REP. The results
are shown in the panels of Figure 2. The top panels show the degree of cooperation in
the asymptotic regime, 〈c〉, while the bottom panels show the final composition of the
population in terms of the fraction of replicator players, xrep. Both 〈c〉 and xrep are shown
as a function of the temptation to defect b and the initial fraction of replicators xrep(0)
and for BA networks (left panels), networks with moderate heterogeneity, corresponding
to α = 0.5 in the model introduced in [30], (panels in the middle) and ER graphs (right
panels).
The bottom panels give the clue to interpret the processes that are taking place
in this first case. REP players completely replace MOR players regardless of the
topology of the substrate network and the values of b and xrep(0) (provided xrep(0) > 0).
Consequently, the level of cooperation (top panels) only depends on the ability of REP
agents to cooperate. This ability, that has been extensively studied (see [1,2] for detailed
reviews) depends on both the temptation b and the substrate topology. Generally
speaking, homogeneous networks with the replicator rule support nonzero cooperation
levels for small b, up to b ≃ 1.2, whereas heterogeneous networks are much better suited
for cooperation under this dynamics [8,42]. The results for the cooperation level, shown
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Figure 2. Moran versus Replicator. The panels in the top denote the fraction of
cooperators, 〈c〉, in the asymptotic regime in BA networks (left) networks with a
moderate degree of heterogeneity, denoted as α = 0.5, (middle) and ER graphs (right).
The panels in the bottom show the final fraction of replicators, xrep for the same
cases as above. In all the panels both the degree of cooperation and the fraction of
replicators are plotted as a function of the temptation b and the initial fraction of
replicators xrep(0).
in the bottom panel, make it clear that we recover the results of those previous studies
as cooperation is strongly enhanced when the heterogeneity of the network increases.
Thus, the MOR rule is basically irrelevant in the presence of REP, a conclusion that
agrees with that found in [27] for the special case of square lattices.
3.2. Moran versus Unconditional Imitation
Having seen that MOR can not survive in the presence of REP in any of the networks
considered, it is important to consider the case of UI vs MOR, a deterministic rule
versus a stochastic, non-monotonous one. If MOR is also suppressed by UI, we can
then conclude that it is a very fragile rule and its relevance will be very limited. In
Fig. 3 we plot the final density of cooperators (top panels) and the final fraction of
imitators (bottom panels) for the three types of networks used in this study, BA networks
(left panels), moderate heterogeneous networks (center panels), and ER graphs (right
panels). For this particular competition, we observe that the competition between these
two rules is closely associated to the emergence of cooperation: UI suppreses MOR only
when cooperation is the asymptotic result, and both quantities 〈c〉 and xui show very
similar values. In particular, for ER networks UI players turn out to be responsible for
all the cooperative behavior observed and the evolutionary dynamics always ends up in
a partition of the population into MOR defectors and UI cooperators. It is interesting to
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Figure 3. Moran versus Unconditional Imitation. The panels in the top denote the
fraction of cooperators, 〈c〉, in the asymptotic regime in BA networks (left) networks
with a moderate degree of heterogeneity, denoted as α = 0.5, (middle) and ER graphs
(right). The panels in the bottom show the final fraction of imitators, xui for the
same cases as above. In all the panels both the degree of cooperation and the fraction
of imitators are plotted as a function of the temptation b and the initial fraction of
imitators xui(0).
note that in this scenario MOR defectors are more disruptive of the global cooperation
level than in the case of a regular square lattice, where cooperation survived until larger
values of the temptation b [27]. We note that, for this weak PD, when UI is the only
update rule it leads to a higher level of cooperative behavior on the entire range of b.
This is very likely due to the fact that the ER networks we are studying, having an
average degree of 〈k〉 = 6, are already close to a well-mixed population, in which UI
leads to full defection in one step. Therefore, the net effect of having interaction between
MOR and UI players is that the cooperation level is reduced and the already mentioned
separation of strategists of two kinds.
When we move to more heterogeneous networks, the situation begins to change. As
shown in the panels of both BA and α = 0.5 networks, some Imitator-Defectors start
to appear when the underlying topology of interactions becomes more heterogeneous:
Note that the level of cooperation, top panels, is lower than the fraction of imitators,
in particular for large b and for large initial fraction of imitator players xui(0). For
the specific case of the BA network, the invasion of imitators is complete in this limit,
appearing when xui(0) > 0.6. In the intermediate case, when α = 0.5, there is a
noticeable fraction of imitator defectors, as we already mentioned, but the invasion of
imitators is not complete. In this regime MOR players are completely removed from
the population. In the other regime, the final coexistence of UI and MOR players (for
0 < xui(0) < 0.6 in BA networks) recovers the partition of ER networks into Moran-
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Defectors and Imiting-Cooperators.
The most striking result of the Moran-Imitator competition is found in the region
0.4 < xui(0) < 0.8 of the BA network. Remarkably, in this regime the coexistence
(which is only a transient for 0.6 < xui(0) < 0.8) between MOR and UI enhances the
average level of cooperation with respect to the limit in which only imitators are present,
i.e., the combination of strategies is optimal in terms of the survival of cooperation. As
stated above, in the lower half of the region coexistence is established between two
types of agents, MOR defectors and UI cooperators pointing out that the localization
of defective behavior in Moran players enhance the ability of imitators to cooperate.
On the other hand, the fact that the phenomenon persists when the coexistence is only
temporary (upper half of the region) makes it clear that survival of MOR defectors in
the asymptotic regime is not a necessary condition for the improving of cooperation.
This phenomenon is reminiscent of the enhancement of cooperation observed in [41] due
to errors, but we want to stress that its mechanism must be different because the case
studied in that paper refers to a situation in which update rules do not co-evolve with
the strategies.
3.3. Replicator Dynamics versus Unconditional Imitation
Given that in the previous two scenarios both imitators and replicators have remarkably
outperformed the ability of MOR players to survive (albeit MOR is only completely
suppressed by UI in heterogeneous networks for same range of parameters), the
competition between replicators and imitators will unveil what is, on average, the most
effective update mechanism.
We start by analyzing the BA network. As shown in the bottom-left panel of Fig.
4, REP players invade the whole final population for large values of b. However, when
the temptation to defect decreases the final fraction of imitators within the population
increases. In particular, the final fraction of imitators xui = 1 − xrep increases with
its initial frequency, xui(0) = 1 − xrep(0). This latter behavior has deep implications
regarding the final degree of cooperation. As shown in the top-left panel of Fig. 4,
cooperators tend to survive the more the larger xui(0) is (with the exception of the
case xui(0) = 1). This result points out that the existence of any small fraction of
imitators coexisting with a majority of replicators promote cooperation in the system.
It is very interesting to realize that the cooperation level on BA networks is lower when
the update rule is UI than when REP is the rule [2] . Therefore, what we are observing
here is that, when both types of dynamics are mixed, a non-trivial coupling between
them arises such that the final cooperation level is higher when some UI players are left
in the population. Again, this points out to a diversity effect similar to the one reported
in [41], but the same caveat we expressed above applies.
When the heterogeneity of the network decreases (middle and right panels) we
observe from the panels in the top that, as usual, the degree of cooperation decreases.
However, this decrease in the total fraction of cooperators is accompanied by the survival
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Figure 4. Replicator versus Unconditional Imitation. The panels in the top denote the
fraction of cooperators, 〈c〉, in the asymptotic regime in BA networks (left) networks
with a moderate degree of heterogeneity, denoted as α = 0.5, (middle) and ER graphs
(right). The panels in the bottom show the final fraction of replicators, xrep for the
same cases as above. In all the panels both the degree of cooperation and the fraction
of replicators are plotted as a function of the temptation b and the initial fraction of
replicators xrep(0).
of imitators in some regions of the parameter space as shown by the bottom panels. In
particular, for moderate values of xrep(0) and intermediate values of b (b ≃ 1.5 for
α = 0.5 and b ≃ 1.3 in ER networks) we find a significant fraction of the population
playing as UI. These UI players constitute the main source of cooperation in the systems
since we have checked that the remaining part of the population, composed of replicator
players, are defectors. Therefore, the natural trend of REP players (as observed from
the corresponding panels in Fig. 2) to defect in this region is opposed by the ability
of imitators to cooperate for larger values of b. Outside these two regions, we observe
again the prevalence of replicators which play as cooperators and defectors for small
and large values of b respectively.
4. Conclusions
In summary, in this paper we have largely extended the work on co-evolution of strategies
and update rules on square lattices reported in [27]. We have focused on the role of
the degree of heterogeneity of the network by considering a model that allows to go
from BA to ER networks. The main conclusion of this work is that in all the cases
considered, the co-evolution process leads to the survival of cooperation, even when
the temptation to defect is relatively high. This allows us to conclude that generically,
co-evolutionary dynamics on networks is very different from the mean-field problem. In
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addition, the study we have carried out sheds more light on the picture that emerged
from the preliminary work [27]: While in that paper it was reported that on square
lattices REP displaced UI which in turn displaced MOR, we have learned here that this
statement requires a number of qualifications. Thus, it is actually the case that REP
displaces MOR in all networks studied, but the other two competitions do not show
such a clear-cut outcome. As we have described in detail above, UI displaces MOR
completely only when the co-evolution process takes place on BA networks and the
temptation parameter is large, whereas a fraction of UI survives when competing with
REP in all the networks studied, at least for a range of temptation values and initial
condition frequencies.
The asymptotic coexistence of update rules leads to interesting phenomena such
as the complete segregation between UI cooperators and MOR defectors, or the
enhancement of cooperation as compared to the case when only one rule is present in
a number of cases. The first feature, the segregation phenomenon, is likely to arise due
to the fact that UI cooperators survive through clustering, whereas UI defectors cannot
imitate their MOR neighbors (the rule applies only if the payoff is strictly larger than
the player’s) but the converse is possible. Therefore, compact groups of cooperators are
UI, and the ‘outside sea’ of defection necessarily ends up being MOR. Concerning the
second observation, the enhancement of cooperation by the co-evolution of update rules,
we have already mentioned its resemblance to the improvement of cooperation by errors
reported in [41]. However, it is clear that the relation between the two mechanisms
can only be established through the existence of different time scales involved in the
global dynamics, as in [41] the update rules are fixed. In the preliminary report [27],
the relevance of the time scales was already noted, but it was also pointed out that
the mechanism behind it is far from clear. Time scales are relevant because rules that
are more prone to change, and therefore lead to more frequent strategy changes, carry
the seed of their own extinction, because in our setup they will copy the update rules
that lead to less frequent changes. However, the tests carried out in [27] with two
versions of UI, one acting only every 10 time steps, showed that while this was part
of the ingredients of the co-evolution, it could not explain by itself the whole set of
observations. Our work here gives far more support to the idea that time scales play
a key role, by showing that, even for the same rule, the heterogeneity of the network
induces different rates of invasion of different nodes. All this makes it clear that it is
necessary to design a specific setup in which the time scales are controlled.
From a more general viewpoint, our work supports the claim that, if update rules
grounded on an evolutionary framework are the ones that should be used, REP is by
far the most likely candidate among the three ones we have studied. Of course, we
do not claim that we have completely solved this issue. Given the non-triviality of
the co-evolutionary process, a three-rule competition should be analyzed to confirm
this statement, as when the three rules are present the dynamics could be different.
Furthermore, other rules, such as the Fermi rule [37] or the best-response rule [43, 44]
should also be included in the competition. Another important point would be to
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consider other games. We can reasonably expect our results to be valid in a parameter
region close to the weak PD, reaching into the strict PD and the Snowdrift game.
However, we can not predict how far this region extends and whether games with
different equilibrium structure, such as the Stag-Hunt, would give rise to the same
results we report here. Clearly, all this calls for a more ambitious study for which the
present report is paving the way. Finally, we find it particularly interesting that the
observation of coexistence in the asymptotic state of some rules agrees with experimental
findings of diversity in the behavior of humans playing PD games on lattices [11, 12].
Further work is needed to compare in detail the outcome of the co-evolutionary process
with the available experimental data.
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